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THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
CAPITALIST STATE: BILLS OF RIGHTS
IN JEOPARDY
ANTHONY CHASE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this "springtime of peoples" accompanying the sudden col-
lapse of totalitarian regimes, we commonly perceive bills of
rights-written or unwritten manifests of legally enforceable, fun-
damental human rights-as reinvigorated and constitutional liber-
ties1 seem more secure at home as well as finally attainable abroad.
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center. B.A. 1972, Wisconsin; J.D. 1978,
Wayne State; L.L.M. 1979, Harvard. This essay was written prior to Iraq's invasion of Ku-
wait in 1990, and the subsequent war in the Persian Gulf; the author, however, feels no need
to change what he has written here, in spite of these apparently momentous events. On the
contrary, President Bush was clearly willing to go to war with or without Congress, once the
Russians and Chinese had been adequately solicited; his announcement of an ambitious
New World Order may assist the reader in understanding the real concerns that motivate
the author's critical analysis herein.
I Legal rights, especially those recognized in constitutions, charters, and declarations,
are frequently divided into two categories: rights of negative and positive liberty. See I.
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969); C. MAcPHER-
soN, Berlin's Division of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEvAL 95-119
(1973); see also F. CUNNINGHAM, DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND SociALISM 141-99 (1987) (discus-
sion of liberal democracy and individual rights); T. O'HAGAN, THE END OF LAW? 116-20
(1984) (rights easily abused without bill of rights). Although a few legal scholars reject this
distinction, see Weinreb, The Complete Idea of Justice, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 752, 792 (1984),
the division can serve a useful purpose in some instances, see Chase, Book Review, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 304, 320-25 (1985) (reviewing T. CAMPBELL, THE LEFT AND RIGHTS: A CON-
CEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF SOCIALIST RIGHTS (1983) and M. GIBSON, WORKERS' RIGHTS
(1983). A familiar socialist argument asserts that negative or "formal" rights may form a
barrier to the pursuit of positive or "social" rights. See, e.g., Wolvovitz & Lobel, The Right
to Equality: A Marxist Analysis, in THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD: FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN 331, 332 (A. Ginger & E. Tobin eds. 1988). "When, spurred on by formal
rights, the masses of people demand social rights, formal equality turns into its opposite and
becomes a major bulwark of reaction, providing the ideological and legal handle for stifling
the struggle and perpetuating inequality." Id.
The above critique is not neccessarily "Marxist." Presumably a Marxist perspective
would find that "the masses of people demand social rights" because class struggles spur
them on. Neither ideological labels nor formal rights would be sufficient by themselves to
stifle revolutionary, working-class social movements. See 1 THE HISTORY OF MARXISM:
MARXISM IN MARX'S DAY 166-91 (E. Hobsbawm ed. 1982); G. DELLA VOLPE, LOGIC AS A POSI-
TIVE SCIENCE passim (J. Rothschild trans. 1980). A more satisfying argument asserts that
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The widespread call for freedom and rights, emanating from
Tiananmen Square, Bucharest, and the Berlin Wall stirs the heart.
The promise of international sanctions against recalcitrant pockets
of Stalinist tyranny encourages the hope that, this time, the whole
world can be gathered under the umbrella of an American-style
Bill of Rights.2
Foreign policy associations and international organizations call
for a decade of "the rule of law." Even the Russians claim they
want to see the United Nations and the World Court given effec-
tive power to enforce human rights globally. Just in time for the
bicentennial of the first ten amendments to the United States Con-
stitution, everyone else seems, at long last, to have caught on.3
without positive rights, negative rights cannot be realized. See G. DELLA VOLPE, ROUSSEAU
AND MARx 113-14 (J. Fraser trans. 1979). Della Volpe's assertion that positive rights are the
foundation of effective individual liberty is both original and powerful. However, unless oth-
erwise indicated, I will be referring to the conventional negative liberties when using such
designations as "constitutional rights" or "fundamental human rights."
2 For the most extreme writers and pundits, the Revolution of 1989 has apocalyptic
significance. The headlines proclaiming Communism's "grand failure" signal nothing short
of "The End of History." Cf. Alter, The Intellectual Hula Hoop: Why the Hyping of 'The
End of History' Says More About Washington Than the Theory Itself, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9,
1989, at 39 (deputy director of State Department's policy planning sees end of major wars
and geopolitical struggles; environmental and technical questions rather than philosophical
differences will dominate international discourse). Other barometers of public culture, such
as financial editors and legal academics agree. See, e.g., Fund, World's Workers Are Uniting
... For Capitalism, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1990, at A12, col. 3 (Eastern Europeans immersing
themselves in "family, career, church or self-improvement," not political questions); Akers,
To the Editor, Law & Soc'y News., Mar., 1990, at 2, col. 2 ("desire for freedom and democ-
racy has begun to overtake the communist world, using the U.S. and Western democracies
as the model").
Common to these views is their emphasis on the idea of a fundamental break with the
past, the plea to finally acknowledge that capitalism has won, and the celebration of the
"end of ideology." See Lears, A Matter of Taste: Corporate Cultural Hegemony in a Mass-
Consumption Society, in RECASTING AMERICA: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF COLD
WAR 38, 42 (L. May ed. 1989). By midcentury, "the emphasis on national uniqueness and
homogeneity.... pervaded postwar social thought. The tendency to see American culture as
a monolithic and autonomous entity required a systematic inattention to power relations."
Id.
For those who equate the collapse of communist regimes with "the end of history," the
rapid spread of free markets closes the debate on "economic justice." Fund, supra. For an
alternative to this new edition of "the end of ideology," see V. HELD, PROPERTY, PROFITS,
AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE passim (1980) (essays discussing competing theoretical goals of
society).
3 See generally Z. BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND FAILURE: THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF COMMU-
NISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY passim (1989) (author credited with having predicted de-
mise of communism).
For dissenting or cautionary responses to the "fall of communism," see Maynes,
America Without the Cold War, 78 FOREIGN POL'Y. 3, 16 (1990) ("[iut would be worse than
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Yet appearances may deceive. What is being universalized is
not democracy, but the capitalist economic system and its attend-
ant form of government 4-historically antithetical to precisely
ironic if the opportunity to enter into a constructive agreement with the Soviet Union in the
field of international law were lost because, at the very moment that the Soviet Union be-
came more lawful, the United States decided to become more lawless"); Monteiro, Joe
Slovo's 'Has Socialism Failed?' (Book Review), POL. AFF. 29 (Apr. 1990); Navarro, Histori-
cal Triumph: Capitalism or Socialism?, 41 MONTHLY REV. 37 (No. 6, 1989).
Ironically, an initial skepticism regarding the sudden extension of free market capital-
ism was sounded by none other than the United States Central Intelligence Agency. See
East's Economies: A Bleak Forecast, CIA Predicts High Unemployment and Lasting Con-
sumer Shortages, Int'l Herald Tribune, May 17, 1990, at 1, cols. 1-2 (CIA predicts great
financial hardship for Eastern Europe as countries move from centralized, planned econo-
mies to market-oriented systems).
" See Kolko, Global Restructuring and Economic Reforms, in SOCIALISM AND DzMoc-
RACY 23, 23-24 (1990) ("[g]lobal restructuring has been the leitmotif of the past decade");
see also Davies, Gorbachev's Socialism in Historical Perspective, 179 NEW LEFT Rzv. 5, 19-
20 (1990). According to Davies, the future of Soviet socialism has four possible directions:
radical economic reforms combined with democratization; continued directive planning
combined with restructured authoritarian political regime; democratization without radical
reform; and radical economic reform without democratization. Id.
Why should the emergence of "the fourth scenario" in the Soviet Union come as a
surprise? We should probably expect to witness the development of authoritarian capitalism
under post-communist regimes. China provides a splendid example. Despite the massacre at
Tiananmen Square, capitalist political leaders around the world restored trade relations
with China as soon as possible after the massacre, assuming they had actually suspended
such relations. This restoration occurred in the midst of continuing repression of China's
democratic opposition. President George Bush and the United States Department of State
affirmed the necessity of our maintaining China's "most favored nation" trading status,
even should the human rights situation in China further deteriorate. The significance for
Western business of "the fourth scenario" in China is not its inclusion of an authoritarian
political process (an "internal" matter for the Chinese to work out, according to many) but,
rather, its extension of capitalist restoration and Western penetration into the China market
(an "external" matter touching directly on Western interests).
Put simply, the universalization of capitalism mandates export of the capitalist state,
whether in its liberal or authoritarian formation, but little encourages, let alone guarantees,
the spread of democracy and civil liberty. Whether in jail, in hiding, or in exile, this is a
lesson the Chinese student radicals have been taught by United States policy-makers. Nev-
ertheless, "the fourth scenario" continues to have advocates in China, as well as in the So-
viet Union. Kagami Mitsuyuki of the Institute of Developing Economies, in an interview
subsequent to Tiananmen, observed:
Late last year and early this year, a small group of former Red Guards began a
debate on how to resolve China's problems. They developed a theory centered on
the "new authoritarianism." The theoretical inspiration for this debate come [sic]
from Samuel Huntington [Harvard political scientist] and other American intel-
lectuals who spoke of the need to introduce a strongman type of political system
in order to oveicome the gap between the super-modern China emerging in the
coastal areas and the large cities, and the super-underdeveloped China of the re-
mote countryside. They held that it was essential for the state to impose a super-
centralized system of political power, and they praised the former south [sic] Ko-
rean dictator Chun Doo-hwan, and Taiwan's former leader Jiang Jiangquo. These
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those individual liberties at the heart of any fundamental charter
of human rights. Anyone who thinks that capitalism's recent,
"shadowed victory"" will ensure the survival, let alone the vitality,
of our own Bill of Rights is taking a large political gamble.
Rather than repeat an important but familiar story of Ameri-
can support for fascist, neo-fascist, and other right-wing govern-
ments, I want to unravel the complicated notion of capitalism's
politics. Ruling classes entrusted with managing capitalism's affairs
of state have resisted vigorously the essential components of the
rule of law.8 I suggest that such resistance is apparent in the politi-
dictators succeeded in stimulating rapid economic growth.
Selden & Mitsuyuki, China: The Roots of Madness, 20 Am'o: JAPAN-ASIA Q. REV. 104, 112
(1989). Like the capitalist state itself, Harvard University's imperial values appear to have
found worldwide export. See Trumpbour, Harvard, The Cold War, and the National Secur-
ity State, in How HARVARD RULES: REASON IN THE SERVICE OF EMPIRE 51 passim (1989).
t See Halliday, The Ends of Cold War, 180 NEW LEFT REV. 5, 5-24 (1990); Themes, 180
NEW LEFT REV. 1, 1 (1990) (examining vitality as well as contradictions of capitalism).
6 See A. ARBLASTER, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF WESTERN LIBERALISM 73 (1984).
Government ... to be carried on according to "the rule of law"... is by no means
a clear [principle]. Human laws do not, after all emanate directly from God or
nature, even if they are thought to be based on divine or natural law. They have
to be formulated by someone, even if it is not the king or sovereign. The transfer-
ence of the law-making function from a king to a parliament or other assembly
does not in itself provide any guarantee against unjust or tyrannical laws. How-
ever, it was argued that an elected and accountable assembly would find it more
difficult to enact laws which were clearly partial or oppressive. And there were
other restrictions on their law-making powers. Laws could only be made within
the framework of the constitution .... Finally, the implementation and interpre-
tation of the laws were to be placed in the hands of institutions which would be
independent of the government of the day. In these various ways it was hoped
that the "rule of law" could be separated from, and raised above the mere will of
the body that did actually make the laws.
Id.
First, the law-making power must reside at the point in the system where the most
"elected and accountable" institution or body actually functions. From king to parliament,
from property-owning males to "universal manhood suffrage" regardless of race, and from
there through extension to women of the right to vote, the road to universal suffrage has
been long and notoriously violent, with present generations relearning its history from con-
temporary struggles gripping South Africa, and the world. See Therborn, The Rule of Capi-
tal and the Rise of Democracy, 103 NEW LEFT REV. 3, 11-17 (1977); see also Halisi, Popular
Struggle: Black South African Opposition in Transformation (Book Review), 46/47 RAmi-
CAL HIsT. REV. 388, 388 (1990) (considering "racial domination, capitalist development, and
democratic movements" in South African history to understand "character, complexity, and
pervasiveness of black resistance to white minority rule").
The spirit of the laws must animate the state and its institutions, thus compelled to
"operate within limits which are either laid down in an explicit, written constitution, or take
the form of a rather more vaguely conceived body of 'fundamental' laws and customs." A.
ARBLASTER, supra, at 72. Only through the institutionalization of universal suffrage and fun-
damental constitutional rights can the cause of democracy be advanced. Bills of rights,
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cally transcendent commitment of Germany, Japan and the United
States to a capitalist future; it may well endanger the values of
universal suffrage and fundamental human rights.
II. A REALITY-BASED METHODOLOGY
Commonplace to American political science has been the prac-
tice of confronting the reality of world communism with merely
the idea of liberalism.7 The "beautiful and enticing picture" of
"free world" or "free market" liberty has perpetuated this mis-
match between idea and reality.8 If we confront a Stalinist political
therefore, must be seen in this view as an essential component of the rule of law and key
provisions within the architecture of liberty. See id. at 74. Arblaster believes Western liber-
alism has declined, in part, because of the subordination of the rule of law to the rule of
capital. Id.; see also G. LuKAcs, LENIN: A STUDY ON THE UNITY OF His THOUGHT 20 (N.
Jacobs trans. 1970) (" 'necessary link' uniting capitalist development to democracy must
reveal itself to be a complete illusion").
Most capitalist ideologues do not distinguish between communism in and out of
power, i.e., between the communist state and the left-wing social movements in which com-
munists often play a critical role. Failure to make such a distinction surely shortchanges the
historical record. See, e.g., Sayle, Broke New World, FAR E. EcoN. REV. 32, 33 (1990) (ac-
knowledging unique role of Japanese Communists in anti-fascist resistance).
Vietnamese Communists, like their counterparts in the Japanese resistance to emperor-
system fascism, demonstrated unprecedented courage in their resistance to the state terror-
ism of the American-backed, Diem-Ky-Thieu dictatorships. Yet, it is not only communists
"out of power" who have been underestimated by cold-warriors in the West. Halliday, supra
note 5, at 9 ("Without [post-World War II] Stalingrad, a Nazi regime might still be in
power, not only in Berlin and Warsaw, but in Paris and Amsterdam as well").
Western political leaders sometimes fail to distinguish friends from adversaries if Com-
munists are involved. Funke, Bitburg, Jews, and Germans: A Case Study of Anti-Jewish
Sentiment in Germany During May 1985, 38 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 57, 57-58 (1986) (dis-
cussing President Reagan's visit to Bitburg and former Nazi concentration camp in Bergen-
Belsen, seeming to embrace both victims and perpetrators of Nazi-terror); see Lambrose,
The Abusable Past, 34 RADICAL HIST. REv. 117, 117 (1986) (President Reagan characterized
Americans fighting Spanish fascists as "on the wrong side").
8 See F. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
MODERN SOCIETY 175 (1986).
It belongs to the commonest tricks of a certain type of political science to confront
the idea of one type of state with the reality of another; to confront the ideology
of a political idea with the sociology of an antagonistic theory.... The beautiful
and enticing pictures painted of the proffered state theory appear of course pref-
erable to a conception of the state whose functioning is depicted in the darkest
colours. This struggle with unequal weapons is as regards the public always won
by the stronger weapon, the more if this Utopia is helped forward by more or less
gentle coercion.
Id.
Especially noteworthy is Neumann's demonstration of how this tactic was developed by
advocates of the "corporate state," the "leadership state," and of the "Soviet system," in
their struggle against liberalism and its political theorists; how willing the liberals were to
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apparatus not with the ideology of the West, but with its reality,
we will more likely see the similarities between the two former
cold war adversaries. Critical to both systems is the struggle of
state power to thwart the efforts of human rights advocates and
internal social movements.' The future of constitutional rights,
now subordinated to the imperatives of a capitalist world-system,
is in doubt.10
The disappearance of communist movements, if accompanied
by diminished international opposition to authoritarianism and in-
equality, could forge a geopolitical structure resembling that pre-
ceding the first World War and the Bolshevik Revolution.11 The
borrow this same tactic of argument within a post-war world where they maintained the
upper hand. See id. However, the tactic is without merit: "[A]n idea can only be confronted
with an idea, and a reality only with another reality." Id.; see 0. KIRCHHEIMER & F. NEU-
MANN, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW passim (1987); F. NEUMANN, THE DEMO-
CRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 216-56 (1957) [hereinafter F. NEUMANN, DEMOCRATIC
AND AUTHORITARIAN STATE]; Chase, The Left On Rights: An Introduction, 62 TEx. L. REV.
1541, 1542-53 (1984); S6ellner, Franz Neumann, 50 TELos 171 (1981-82).
' See, e.g., D. KELLNER, HERBERT MARCUSE AND THE CRISIS OF MARXISM 5 (1984) (dis-
cussing Marcuse's criticism of both Soviet Marxism and United States capitalism, especially
his excoriation of "new forms of domination, repression and social control").
10 See generally G. ARRIGHI, T. HOPKINS & I. WALLERSTEIN, ANTISYSTEMIC MOVEMENTS
90 (1989); T. SHANNON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD-SYSTEM PERSPECTM 16-23 (1989);
Wallerstein, The Reagan Non-Revolution, or the Limited Choices of the US, 16 MILLEN-
NIUM: J. OF INT'L STUD. 467 (1987) (providing two forms of capitalistic centralization on a
world scale: financial pools and integrated labor processes). For a further exploration of the
increasing relevance of Marxian economic analysis, see S. AMIN, G. ARRIGHI, A. FRANK & I.
WALLERSTEIN, TRANSFORMING THE REVOLUTION: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE WORLD SYSTEM
passim (1990).
-i See Gardner, China and the World After Tiananmen Square, 10 SAIS REV. 133, 146
(1990).
[T]he contemporary geopolitical constellation [is] moving towards a pattern remi-
niscent of that which preceded World War I .... [T]he rise of nationalism and
demands for democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe bear strong re-
semblance to the social democratic and nationalist demands within Imperial Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary prior to World War I. The pro-democracy movement
in China, similarly, bears a strong resemblance to Czarist Russia's social-demo-
cratic movement.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Gardner, Averting World War III: Beyond the World War I,
World War II Analogies, 8 SAwS REV. 121 (1988) (earlier comparison of pre-World War I
with current political conflicts). Compare G. CRAIG & A. GEORGE, FORCE AND STATECRAFT:
DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS OF OUR TImE 40-47 (1983) (discussing confrontation between London-
Paris-St.Petersburg axis and Rome-Berlin-Vienna axis in decade preceding first World War)
with I. WALLERSTEIN, The USA in the World Today, in THE POLITICS OF THE WORLD ECON-
OmY 69, 77 (1984) (suggesting that Washington-Tokyo-Beijing axis may face Bonn-Paris-
Moscow axis in next decade). No one seemed to anticipate the present crisis in the East, yet
Wallerstein, more than a decade ago, accurately predicted the present crisis in the West.
See Ragin & Chirot, The World System of Immanuel Wallerstein: Sociology and Politics as
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United States, Germany, and Japan would again constitute power-
ful capitalist states, 12 each dominated by a political regime hostile
to the rule of law. Indeed, our own Bill of Rights only gained gen-
eral application,'3 and universal suffrage national adoption, 4 after
History, in VIsION AND 1,TrHOD IN HISToRmcAL SOCIOLOGY 276, 277 (T. Skocpol ed. 1984)
(discussing development of Wallerstein's first principle--"that capitalist progress is theft on
a global scale"-through variety of issues from "the coming demise of NATO to the transi-
tion from feudalism to capitalism").
12 See, e.g., Rowley, Invisible Hand: The New Superpowers, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb.
22, 1990, at 62 (prospect of Europe's growing self-sufficiency "arises in unhappy conjunction
with the growing trade friction between Japan and the US" and causes uncertain economic
future for "those countries not immediately identifiable with any of the new Big Three"); cf.
J. WILSON, THE POWER ECONOMiY xv-xvi (1985) (asserting that conflicts between major coun-
tries preclude consensus on "desired course of economic policy"); Garten, Japan and Ger-
many: American Concerns, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 84 (1989-90) (analyzing impact of Japanese and
German economic decisions on United States).
"3 See, e.g., Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 455, 463-64 (1986) (speech given by Attorney General Ed-
win Meese III to ABA in Washington D.C. on July 9, 1985).
Neither political expediency nor judicial desire was sufficient to change the clear
import of the language of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states-not until 1925, that is.... [N]owhere else has the principle of Federalism
been dealt such a politically violent and constitutionally suspect blow as by the
theory of incorporation.
Id. (footnote omitted). In other words, in spite of the common association of the liberties
protected by the Bill of Rights with the founding of the nation itself, those liberties did not
find general protection in the United States-to whatever extent they may have become
secure-until after the War and the Bolshevik Revolution. See W. WILLIAMS, AMAERICANS IN
A CHANGING WORLD 160 (1978) (President Wilson endorsed a "slow program of reform"
partly from fear that Bolshevism-or other left-wing ideologies-would gain force in US).
While an impatient world regarded the very gradual "incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights as a necessary program of reform, the Chief Legal Officer of the United States under
Ronald Reagan believed that "expansive civil libertarianism" could be "a threat to the no-
tion of .... [an] energetic government." See Meese, supra at 464. By the final quarter of
the twentieth century, many conservatives have come to regard the availability of federal
constitutional rights against state government to be inherently unconstitutional. See Grag-
lia, A Theory of Power, NAT'L REV., July 17, 1987, at 34-35.
The first ten amendments to the Constitution-the so-called Bill of Rights,
adopted two years [after the Constitution]-add a few substantive and several
procedural rights, all of which were intended to limit only the Federal Govern-
ment, not the states. The vast bulk of the modern-era Supreme Court's constitu-
tional decisions, however, involve not federal but state law-to which the Bill of
Rights does not apply.
Id.
Thus, rather than celebrate any Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights, it would be more
candid, and reflect more sober judgment, for us to acknowledge that the general protection
of fundamental constitutional rights in the United States must be measured, at best, in
terms of five or six decades rather than two centuries. The constitutional or legal basis of
such protection has always been tenuous and tends too often to reflect claims made for "law
in the books," rather than "law in practice." See, e.g., J. CANNON, SOCIALISM ON TRIAL pas-
sim (1970) (insightful commentary on struggle to secure original liberties against govern-
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the Great War. Thus, our most recent historical experience of a
world without communism offers little encouragement for those
who take seriously the rule of law. We must consider the reality of
politics in the capitalist state to evaluate critically current
ment encroachment); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION passim (1970)
(same); P. IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS passim (1990) (same); M. LINFIELD,
FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL LBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR passim (1990) (identifying
major forms of governmental restraints on freedom during various war periods); R.
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS passim (1987) (examining Abrams case and historic fight for
freedom of speech); H. ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES passim (1980)
(same).
1 The United States did not even begin to adopt majoritarian electoral institutions, let
alone universal suffrage, until the ratification of the nineteenth amendment in 1920, which
prohibited electoral discrimination on account of sex. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. Adult
suffrage was extended after Native Americans received the right to vote in 1924. See Pub. L.
No. 175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 173, 224 (1924)) (declaring all non-citizen
Indians born within the territorial limits of the U.S. to be citizens) (repealed 1952). Thus,
even the right to vote, afforded a majority of United States citizens, represents a twentieth
century modification of an eighteenth century constitution. See, e.g., W. WILLIAMS, supra
note 13, at 437-38 (describing turning point for enactment of voting rights legislation during
Lyndon Johnson's presidency). Universal suffrage in practice had to wait upon the voting
rights revolution, an aspect of the civil rights struggle of the 1950's and 1960's. Id.; see
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973ff-6 (1990)); see also J. WLLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE, AMERICA'S
CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, 282-83 (1987) ("Recent events in Alabama, involving mur-
der, savage brutality, and violence by local police, state troopers, and posses, have so
aroused the nation as to make action by this Congress necessary and speedy") (quoting
Congressman E. Celler of House Judiciary Committee). Indeed, Celler stated that passage of
the Voting Rights Act prior to the events he described was "inconceivable." Id. Thus genu-
ine universal suffrage in the United States remained unsecured as late as the second-half of
the twentieth century. Its ultimate adoption places the United States, in spite of its consti-
tutional history, perhaps but a few decades ahead of South Africa regarding formal juridical
recognition and legislative enactment of one person, one vote.
Moreover, the statutory adoption of full voting rights in the United States reflects the
general proposition that "the juncture at which mere liberalism, sometimes held together
only by the Leviathan's sword, turned into liberal democracy was the breakthrough of uni-
versal suffrage." Feher, Book Review, 41 TELOS 220, 221 (1979) (emphasis added); see also
Hartog, Partial Readings, 5 Focus ON L. STUD. 6, 7 (1990) (constitutional history is more
than "a body of texts authoritatively interpreted by a specialized elite," and is marked by
persistent rights consciousness).
Political sociologist Giran Therborn has defined "bourgeois democracy," at a minimum,
as requiring a government elected on the basis of "universal and equal suffrage." Therborn,
The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy, in STATES AND SOCIETIES 261, 262 (D. Held,
J. Anderson, B. Gieben, eds. 1983). Therborn indicated that "bourgeois democracy" was not
established in Germany until 1949 (perhaps later), in Japan until 1952, and in the United
States until approximately 1970 (after race-based electoral discrimination was prohibited
during the voting rights revolution of the 1960's). Id. at 264. Women had not won the right
to vote in Belgium, France, Italy, or Japan until after the second World War. Id. at 265.
Thus, in the United States, as in Germany, and the capitalist world in general, universal
suffrage was essentially an achievement following the defeat of Hitler in Europe and the
onset of the Pax Americana. See Rowley, supra note 12.
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problems facing charters of human rights. Ideology must be aban-
doned as a convenient instrument of propaganda ministries and
academic (including law school) theorists. The current constitu-
tional predicament requires us to identify the significance and
character of the rule of law, the historical development of the capi-
talist state, and the relationship between these two forces and the
struggle to preserve and extend human liberty.
III. EXPLORING THE RULE OF LAW
A. Various Perspectives
No matter how various theorists tend to complicate the rule of
law, 5 the notion is relatively simple. Its simplicity can clarify both
the political context in which debates over the term are conducted
as well as the meaning (and utility) of the term itself. A histori-
cally situated conception acknowledges that all laws "have to be
formulated by someone."'" However, it also recognizes that a bill of
rights' constitutional guarantees of universal suffrage and enforcea-
ble limits on state power are critical to any evaluation of a political
regime's regard for and protection of liberty.17 Against this histor-
ico-critical definition 8 there exist two alternative conceptions of
5 See generally V. AUBERT, IN SEARCH OF LAW: SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO LAW 98-
123 (1983); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW passim (1964) (examining how law and moral-
ity interrelate); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 362-75 (A. Wedberg trans.
1945) (monistic and pluralistic approaches to national and international law); THE RULE OF
LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY passim (A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan eds. 1987); J. SHKLAR, LE-
GALIsM passim (1964) (classic critique by insightful political philosopher); 1 & 2 M. WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCmTY passim (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968); Wood, The Fundamental-
ists and the Constitution, THE N.Y. REv., Feb. 18, 1988, at 33.
" See A. ARBLASTER, supra note 6.
" See id.; N. BOBBIo, THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY passim (R. Griffin trans. 1987).
18 For an example from the adjacent discipline of theology, see H. KONG, THEOLOGY FOR
THE THRD MILLENNIUM: AN ECONOMICAL VIEW 113 (P. Heinegg trans. 1988) (defending exe-
gesis with "historico-critically responsible dogmatic theology"); see also A SCHILLEBEECKX
READER (R. Schreiter ed. 1984) (selected works by the prominent Catholic theologian de-
fended, among others, by Kiing). Such historico-critically responsible scholarship is gener-
ally missing from critical legal deconstruction. See Chase, An Obscure Scandal of Con-
sciousness, 1 YALE J.L. & HumANrrxEs 105, 111-14 (1988) [hereinafter Chase, An Obscure
Scandal] (providing illustration of one central contradiction within CLS); Chase, Law and
Ideology Critique Under Spiritless Conditions: A View of the Reagan Years, 17 CAP. U.L.
REv. 225 passim (1988). See generally Constitutional Law from a Critical Legal Perspec-
tive: A Symposium, 36 BUFFALO L. REv. 211-426 (1987). In its plunge into deconstructive
waters, Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") abandoned discourse tainted by history, social the-
ory, or Marxism, unavoidably excluding even the Frankfurt School itself, the originator of
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:85
the rule of law.
1. Literalism and Ideology
The first interprets the words literally; it declares law as the
sole sovereign, convinced, not only of the possibility, but of the
necessity, of "government of laws and not of men." 19 An alterna-
tive and opposing perspective conceives of legal rules and systems
as important primarily as ideas; legal ideology generally, and the
rule of law in particular are understood as "false consciousness, ' '2 0
"Critical Theory." Professor Tushnet has accurately described the movement's reversal of
its earlier critical stance. See Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Ori-
gins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 512 (1986).
The renunciation of the theoretical dimension of the initial project of CLS helps
explain an otherwise curious characteristic of recent critical legal scholarship. Al-
though it devotes a great deal of attention to phenomena that occurred in the
past, much of the work is relentlessly ahistorical. It focuses synchronically on par-
ticular moments in the past or offers a sort of comparative statics, but never gives
a diachronic account of transformation over time. I believe that this ahistoricism
is linked to the critique of social theory, because diachronic accounts explicitly or
implicitly rely on social theory to give them coherence. . . . Having renounced
social theory, CLS is barred/precluded from using these standard traditions of his-
torical writing-thus its characteristic ahistoricism.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Jay, Neumann and the Frankfurt School, Foreword to F.
NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW (1986). For further skepticism regarding the deconstructive
enterprise, see Chase, Cockburn on Empire, 40 MONTHLY REV. 51 (1988); Wiener, Decon-
structing de Man, TH NATION, Jan. 9, 1988, at 22; Letters: Deconstruction, The Nazis, &
Paul de Man, THE N.Y. REV., Oct. 12, 1989, at 68; see also Raskin, Laying Down the Law:
The Empire Strikes Back, in How HARVARD RULES: REASON IN THE SERVICE OF EMPIRE 341,
357 (J. Trumpbour ed. 1989). The problem with CLS's deconstructivism "is that, in isola-
tion, it leads straight back to the status quo. By itself, it is paralyzing. In any case, revela-
tions in 1987 that the founder of literary deconstruction in America, Paul deMan, was a
Nazi collaborationist should be enough to demonstrate that anyone can trash." Id. Raskin
argued that CLS should move from a politically conservative position, supportive of the
status quo, to a politically radical position, necessarily rejecting the paralytic neo-scholasti-
cism of deconstruction. Id. The history of CLS, however, is precisely the reverse, CLS
started with radical politics and gravitated to the right, via deconstruction. Not even the
well-intentioned Raskin is likely to turn CLS around.
There is little "critical" left in Critical Legal Studies today, if ever there were. Professor
Tushnet's only apparent critic regarding his retrospective assertion of CLS's ahistoricism,
presents a somewhat ambiguous complaint. Professor Alan Freeman provided two counter-
examples: an (at the time) unpublished essay and a very recent, autobiographical rather
than historical essay. The ultimate effect confirms Tushnet's look backward at previous CLS
developments. See Freeman, Introduction, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 214 n.3 (1987).
'9 Cf. F. NEUMANN, DEMOCRATIC & AUTHORITARIAN STATE, supra note 8, at 39 ("invoca-
tion of the law as the sole sovereign and the dictum that sovereignty is 'a government of
laws and not of men' make it superfluous to mention that, in reality, men do rule, even
when they rule within the framework of the law").
20 See Chase, An Obscure Scandal, supra note 18, at 112 n.17 (conflicting views of ide-
ology and false consciousness).
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"cooptation, ' '21 or "demobilizing ideology."22 These standard labels
are likely to be familiar to any regular reader of law reviews. The
latter camp ritually exhorts political progressives to comprehend
that "the Rule of Law itself... is the chief obstacle in the path of
the development of class-consciousness. ' 23 There is, I believe, an
increasing tendency today to reject both these standard critiques
of the rule of law. Two recent essays, one written before the advent
of legal deconstruction as advocated by Critical Legal Studies
("CLS") scholars and the other after, illustrate this point.
2. Hart-Simpson Critique
Providing an overview of American jurisprudence from a
somewhat autonomous cultural perspective, noted English legal
scholar H.L.A. Hart has suggested that American jurisprudence is
characterized by two fundamentally different conceptions of the
nature and function of law which he calls the "Nightmare" and the
"Noble Dream.12  According to Hart, the Noble Dream image of
the judge
is that of the "objective, impartial, erudite, and experienced de-
clarer of the law," not to be confused with the very different im-
age of the legislator. The Nightmare is that this image of the
judge, distinguishing him from the legislator, is an illusion, and
the expectations which it excites are doomed to disappointment.
25
Calculation, however, can transform this disappointment into
something more akin to deception as to what is actually going on,
following the views of the ideology critics. The real "nightmare,"
then, is that the rule of law, founded on a grand illusion, can be
systematically manipulated to secure social cohesion, and even ac-
21 See Chase, A Challenge to Workers' Rights, 8 NOVA L.J. 671, 678-84 (1984).
22 Id.; see also Chase, supra note 1, at 310-11 (referring to socialist suspicion of nature
of rights).
23 See H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 139 (1982). But see Chase, supra note 8, at 1556-
57; see also Chase, A Note on the Aporias of Critical Constitutionalism, 36 BUFFALO L. REV.
403, 406 (1987). For an excellent analysis of the relation between law and class conscious-
ness, see SHOP FLOOR BARGAINING AND THE STATE: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVES (S. Tolliday & J. Zeitlin eds. 1985).
24 Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the No-
ble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 971 (1977). Hart's "Noble Dream" can be usefully related to
the literalist camp's conception of rule of law. See id. at 978-89. Hart's "Nightmare" may
likewise be identified with the ideological camp. See id. at 972-78.
2 Id. at 972 (quoting Lord Radcliffe) (footnote omitted).
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quiescence by oppressed groups or classes. Ultimately, rejecting
both the Noble Dream of law (as implausible) and the Nightmare
(as an overreaction even before CLS sought to rewrite Realism via
deconstruction), Hart concluded:
I have protrayed [sic] American jurisprudence as beset by
two extremes, the Nightmare and the Noble Dream: the view that
judges always make and never find the law they impose on liti-
gants, and the opposed view that they never make it. Like any
other nightmare and any other dream, these two are, in my view,
illusions, though they have much of value to teach the jurist in
his waking hours. The truth, perhaps unexciting, is that some-
times judges do one and sometimes the other. It is not of course a
matter of indifference but of very great importance which they do
and when and how they do it. 26
Notwithstanding Hart's matter-of-fact conclusion, another
English legal scholar has commented on the same jurisprudential
puzzle.27 A.W.B. Simpson contrasts legal ideals with legal ico-
noclasm, as Hart had done with the. Noble Dream and the
Nightmare. Duplicating Hart's rejection of the two extremes,
Simpson found:
It does not follow from a more realistic way of thinking about
judicial decisions which abandons the crude antithesis between
will and reason, and which locates them in the practical rather
than the ideal world, that the pursuit of the values associated
with the notion of the rule of law-predictability, consistency, at
a down to earth level not taking bribes-is a futile undertaking,
though we need to remember that the rule of law, like other ide-
als, is not to be thought of as a depiction of reality.28
In other words, according to Simpson, both adversaries in a "battle
between the strong iconoclasts and the strong idealists ... seem to
me to be wrong ....29 I believe the general viewpoint, exemplified
by two relatively detached observers of the American legal debate,
Hart and Simpson, represents the best judgment we can make
when compelled to choose between the two positions staked out by
the literalist and ideological camps.
In an important respect, however, the Hart/Simpson critique
26 Id. at 989.
27 See Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal Ideals, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 819 passim
(1990).
26 Id. at 844.
29 Id.
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remains inadequate. Both commentators apparently believe that
because Noble Dream/idealism stands at one extreme, and
Nightmare/iconoclasm at the other, the truth (or, at least, the wis-
est juridical strategy) inevitably rests somewhere in between. Such
a reading would be equivalent to the assumption that because
paranoid schizophrenia and brief reactive psychosis are both ex-
treme mental states, "sanity" must, quite naturally, reside some-
where in between!30 Indeed, if the historico-critical faculty is the
essential component of a coherent construction of the rule of law,
then its shared absence within literalist and ideological camps
causes these two extremes to be seen as mirror images. Moreover,
in both the Legal Realist generation and the Critical Legal genera-
tion, psychodynamic factors (in contrast to historical and political
ones)3 1 underline the symbiotic relation between two positions
which, in reality, are only superficially opposed. Criticism of both
these abstract and historical conceptions of the rule of law comes
ultimately from the perspective of historical materialism, no longer
willing to be marginalized in the debate.32
3. Popular Misconceptions
If much of the academic debate has evolved through advocacy
of two extreme views sharing a common rejection of social theory,
much of the popular debate has developed according to misconcep-
tions of the American political experience that significantly distort
the relation between liberty and the capitalist state. Advocates of
strong government assert that the importance of minority rights
"I Needless to say, it does not. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987).
31 See generally J. CHASSEGUET-SMIRGEL & B. GRUNBERGER, FREUD OR REICH? PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS AND ILLUSION (C. Pajaczkowska trans. 1986); J. KovEL, THE AGE OF DESIRE: RE-
FLECTIONS OF A RADICAL PSYCHOANALYST (1981) (describing the author's provisional integra-
tion of Marxist theory into his psychoanalytic practice); M. SCHNEIDER, NEUROSIS AND CIV-
LIZATION: A MARXIST/FREUDIAN SYNTHESIS (M. Roloff trans. 1975) (analyzing one effort to
integrate Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism).
" See Gilbert, Intellectual History: Its Aims and Methods, 100 DAEDALUS 80, 94
(1971).
Intellectual history cannot claim to be the true or only history; modem intellec-
tual history arose after belief in the control of events by ideas had collapsed. It
exists only in connection with, and in relation to, the surrounding political, eco-
nomic, and social forces. The investigation of subjects of intellectual history leads
beyond the purely intellectual world and intellectual history per se does not exist.
Id.; see also J. LARRAIN, A RECONSTRUCTION OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 92-126 (1986); A.
WOOD, KARL MARx 61-122 (1981).
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cannot undermine majority rule as the foundation of democratic
government. Advocates of civil liberties counter that democracy
cannot authentically exist without protecting minority rights from
governmental encroachment; 8 indeed, they assert that the Su-
preme Court historically has functioned to protect the rights of mi-
norities against the tyranny of the majority. 4
This is simply mistaken. If the United States did not adopt
majority rule until the 1920's, nor universal suffrage until the last
few decades," how can it reasonably be argued that the Supreme
Court has "historically" protected some minority rights against
predominant majority rule? At best, the Court has protected mi-
nority rights against minority rule. Moreover, the Court's protec-
tion of minority rights against majority rule in the 1920's and
1930's extended generally to corporate property against popular
legislative regulation. Finally, ACLU lawyers and legal theorists
have avoided essential questions: Does electoral majoritarianism,
even universal suffrage, ensure that the capitalist state becomes
the instrument of the majority so that it can control its own
destiny? Is there demonstrable empirical evidence, for example,
that the American people control American foreign policy? Have
13 Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 132-33 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (republican
form of government seeks to secure public good and private rights against danger of major-
ity factions). "[M]easures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the
rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing major-
ity." Id. at 129-30.
34 Cf. C. BLACK, On the Failure and Success of Courts, in THE HUMANE IMAGINATION
145-55 (1986) (examining structure of American citizenship as articulated by Warren
Court); Noonan, The Constitution's Protection of Individual Rights: The Real Role of the
Religion Clauses, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 717-20 (1988) (examining Court's less than full
protection of individual rights in light of constitutional religious liberty).
35 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
36 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936) (striking down congressional
regulation of hour and wage conditions in coal industry); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (striking down congressional delegation to President
of broad authority in regulation of prices in interstate commerce); Williams v. Standard Oil
Co., 278 U.S. 235, 245 (1929) (striking down state statute regulating gasoline pricing), over-
ruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket
Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (striking down regulation of theatre ticket
pricing), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923) (striking down statute establishing minimum wage for women
employees), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (striking down congressional regulation of interstate
shipment of child-manufactured products), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941). But see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) (upholding
protection of workers' rights to self-organization in steel industry under National Labor Re-
lations Act).
BILLS OF RIGHTS IN JEOPARDY
politicians in Washington, whether through the CIA's actions in
Chile or our preference for military aggression in Grenada, Pan-
ama, and elsewhere, arrogated to themselves the right to decide
the future of other nations and people?8 7
Our Bill of Rights guarantees negative liberties-which pro-
tect individuals from the power of the state. As such, it has come
to represent a majoritarian-not elitist-agenda for political strug-
gle. Protecting the freedoms of speech, association, and the press,
as well as the freedom from unlawful searches and seizures, serves
the needs not only of minorities, but also of the majority. Genuine
37 See P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975) (detailed history of worldwide
CIA operation and activities); W. BLUM, THE CIA: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY (1986) (describing
CIA involvement in wide range of efforts to destabilize foreign governments); J. KWITNY,
THE CRIMES OF PATRIOTS (1987) (reviewing history of national security doctrine as invoked
to justify various CIA actions); S. LANDAU, THE DANGEROUS DOCTRINE: NATIONAL SECURITY
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1988); G. LEWIS, GRENADA: THE JEwEL DESPOILED (1987) (describ-
ing events leading up to and following United States' intervention in Grenada); J. PEARCE,
UNDER THE EAGLE: U.S. INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1984)
(describing role of United States in "creating and perpetuating" crises in Central America
and Caribbean); Leis, Panama: The Other Side of Midnight, 23 NACLA: REPORT ON THE
AMERICAS 4 (1990) (providing Panamanian perspective on United States' invasion of Pan-
ama); Maechling, Washington's Illegal Invasion, 79 FOREIGN POL'Y 113 (1990) (analyzing
U.S. invasion of Panama as violation of both treaty commitments and international law);
Nanda, Farer & D'Amato, Agora: U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human
Rights Activists?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 503-516 (1990) (presenting three views on United
States' invasion of Panama).
The inquiry should not be confined to the third world. Under the Reagan-Bush admin-
istration, American capitalism reached unprecedented levels of corruption (e.g., in the HUD
or savings and loan scandals) as the rich looted their own cities and the next generation's
future. As child advocates have regularly pointed out, the United States has become the first
nation in history to make its children its most vulnerable, even exploited class. See N.Y.
Times, Apr. 9, 1985, at A28, col. 1. Within the contemporary history of capitalist inequality,
no industrial nation has dared to push the "split-level society" as far as Presidents Reagan
and Bush. See K. PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: VEALTH AND THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH (1990) (describing redistribution of political power
and wealth that took place during 1980's). Undemocratic control of the capitalist state en-
ables the devaluation of the interests of the entire national community. Domination of the
state by capital permits adoption of the view that the poor do not work because they have
too much and the rich do not work because they have too little. Further, subordination of
United States' foreign policy to the interests of a narrow-ruling elite results in popular
movements abroad being cut off from their own political institutions and aspirations.
National independence requires government by the people, not by businessmen or for-
eign armies; yet the capitalist state's elevation of power and wealth relegates democracy and
the rule of law to secondary status. It instructs others to follow in America's image and to
repeat: "I am what I have." Leis, supra, at 6; see Allen, The Politics of Human Rights, in
These Times, April 25-May 1, 1990, at 12-13 (discussing sharp criticism by representatives
at 1990 meeting of United Nations Human Rights Commission directed at U.S. indifference
to law and human rights violations).
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opposition is found not between minority rights and majority rule,
but rather between the people and the state (and the forces stand-
ing behind it). To recoil from candid political dialogue about the
relation of money and politics, and capitalism and the state, is to
shortchange the democratic principles undergirding the Bill of
Rights.
B. Contributions of American Legal Realism
The rise of an historical and critical approach to the rule of
law is, in essence, part of the general history of democracy's social
and political struggle against ruling classes.3 8 Misconceptions em-
braced by the literalists (and familiar to nineteenth-century theo-
rists), engendered an initial critique. No comprehensive school of
thought within American jurisprudence emerged, however, until
the "loss of innocence" expedited formalism's decline.3 9 The stock
market crash of 1929 and the rising unemployment and economic
instability of the subsequent Depression40 no doubt helped to pro-
voke Professor Karl Llewellyn4 to challenge an artificial political
theory that no longer produced results. For Llewellyn, the crisis of
the Great Depression did not present an occasion for radical de-
partures from the existing Constitution; it did not require ex-
traordinary jurisprudential remedies. Rather, it only required that
legal theorists acknowledge the reality of American legal process.
In order to forestall misconception: I am not arguing that the
See Chase, supra note 1, at 315. "Moreover, as the example of Solidarity suggests,
our empirical focus must also include the struggle of the left opposition within 'already
existing socialism' for a more comprehensive recognition of individual rights than any con-
temporary socialist government has yet been compelled to grant." Id.
19 See H. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE: A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS OF OUR
OWN TIME, 1912-17, vii-xii (1959) (describing cultural revolution in American politics and
culture after World War I); see also K. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN His-
TORY 267-85 (1989) (liberal legal thought emerged from Great Depression and New Deal
eras); L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60, at 3-44 (1986) (analyzing controversy in
development of principles of legal realism); E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-78 (1973) (discussing critiques of
legal realism in 1930's and 1940's as "dangerous theory" for its alleged lack of firm founda-
tion in substantive ethics or morals).
" See J. GARRATY, THE GREAT DEPRESSION 2-49 (1987); G. KOLKO, MAIN CURRENTS IN
MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 100-56 (1976); W. WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 438-78 (1961).
"I See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973) (comprehen-
sive treatment of life and work of Llewellyn and development and significance of realist
movement).
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United States ought to have the sort of constitution loosely desig-
nated as "unwritten." I am arguing that they have such a consti-
tution, and that nobody can stop their having such a constitution,
and that whether anyone likes that fact or not, the fact has been
there for decades, and must be dealt with by any theory that pur-
ports to do a theory's work.42
Professor Llewellyn realized that if the United States were to
respond to the deepening social crisis with even a "constitutional
revolution, ' 43 the change in political decision making would not af-
fect the legal process. The legal state would in no way be dimin-
ished since it did not exist as an autonomous entity in the first
place. Rather, Legal Realism simply demanded a shift in perspec-
tive regarding the same old, unwritten (or written, but marvelously
reread) Constitution."
Legal Realism strikingly affected the ideas of later legal schol-
ars; there was a profusion of experimentation with ideas and social
forms. But Llewellyn, original even among the Realists, dutifully
acknowledged the lack of real novelty in his anti-literalist critique
of constitutional analysis. He cited Bryce, Beard, and Bentley as
precursors, the last of whom "saw and said in 1908 all that should
have been necessary to force constitutional law theory into total
reconstruction. ' '45
Though a wide-ranging intellectual, Llewellyn seemed una-
ware of Italian Professor Antonio Labriola's initial essays, also
published in America in 1908.46 On the relation of reason and law,
Labriola, the political philopopher, wrote:
In our century, legislating has become an epidemic; and rea-
42 Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 2 n.5 (1934).
43 See, e.g., Parrish, The Great Depression, the New Deal, and the American Legal
Order, 59 WASH. L. REv. 723, 726-28 (1984) (discussing change in constitutional analysis
that ultimately occurred).
" See Llewellyn, supra note 42, at 39; see also Parrish, supra note 43, at 726 (Parrish
argues that New Deal period enabled "important changes in the American legal order"and
further that "'constitutional revolution' in 1937... permanently and dramatically changed
the role of the judiciary. Instead of invoking the due process and commerce clauses to veto
progressive laws... the Court retreated to the more secure redoubt of statutory construc-
tion, abandoning the attempt to veto national economic policy").
" See Llewellyn, supra note 42, at 1.
41 See A. LABRIOLA, ESSAYS ON THE MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF HISTORY (C. Kerr
trans. 1908). Originally published in Italy in 1896, the two essays already had been trans-
lated into French and received international recognition. See C. BUcI-GLUCKSMANN, GRAMSCI
AND THE STATE 360-64 (D. Fernbach trans. 1980) (discussing Labriola's theory and influ-
ence); P. PiccoNE, ITALIAN AAxism 53-104 (1983) (same).
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son enthroned in legal ideology has been dethroned by parlia-
ments. In these the antitheses of class interests have taken on the
form of parties; and the parties struggle for or against definite
laws; and all law appears as a simple fact, or as a thing which it is
useful or not useful to do. The proletariat has arisen; and wher-
ever the struggle of the laborers has taken definite form, the
bourgeois codes have been convicted of falsehood .... [N]ew leg-
islation has more than once been revised, and the strangest oscil-
lations may be observed in it .... The consciousness of experi-
ence has come to us and has given us a formula as precise as it is
modest; every rule of law has been and is the customary, authori-
tative, or judicial defense of a definite interest .... History then
has not been a processus for arriving at the empire of reason in
law; it has thus far been nothing else than a series of changes in
the form of subjection and servitude. History then consists en-
tirely in the struggle of interests; and law is but the authoritative
expression of the interests which have triumphed.4 7
Labriola thus pierced the veil of literalism; he exposed the in-
herent limitation within concepts such as the "rule of law." Labri-
ola did not fall victim to deconstruction's anti-historical focus and
conclude, as have many contemporary CLS scholars, that law and
legal rights inevitably generate a "false consciousness" of the
world.48 After outlining the compromises entered into by the bour-
geoisie "in the interest of its own defense,"4 Labriola added what
seems to me a remarkable political insight, one with implications
beyond the immediate jurisprudential context.50 For Labriola, the
struggle for both statutory rights and the franchise creates not
'1 A. LABRIOLA, supra note 46, at 198-200 (emphasis in original). Because Labriola's
Essays is currently out of print in the United States, I have provided a sustained reference.
48 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
'9 A. LABRIOLA, supra note 46, at 55.
See id. at 56-57.
Whatever be the concessions that the bourgeoisie can make in the present eco-
nomic order even if it be a very great reduction in the hours of labor, it always
remains true that the necessity for exploitation upon which the whole present so-
cial order rests imposes limits beyond which capital as a private instrument of
production has no more reason for existence. If a concession to-day can allay one
form of discontent in the proletariat, the concession itself can do nothing less than
give rise to the need of new and ever increasing concessions . . .[T]he political
struggle in which the proletariat takes part democratizes its habits; still more a
real democracy takes birth which, with time, will no longer be able to adapt itself
to the present political form.
Id. (emphasis added). Labriola defended the socialist quality of democratic struggles in be-
half of expanding human rights and universal suffrage, which, taken together represent the
"generic conditions of liberty." Id.
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abandonment of communism, but the new means and conditions
confirming its vision. The "apparent deviations from the revolu-
tion are, at bottom, the very thing which is hastening it. ' 51 Ironi-
cally, demands for fundamental constitutional liberties and direct
political participation in governmental decision making ultimately
precipitated the downfall of those who had ruled the Stalinist state
apparatus for decades. Nonetheless, the central point remains:
nothing-not even the liberalization of capitalist rule nor the
failed experiments under non-capitalist regimes-can alter the
steady increase in the generic conditions of liberty.52 Nor can lib-
erty's ultimate incompatibility with any substitute for genuinely
democratic rule be disturbed. From the French Revolution to the
current phase of political and theoretical reorientation, efforts to
assimilate or eliminate democratic opposition have not changed
the simple, unyielding material fact that the entire present social
order necessarily rests on exploitation. 3 As capitalism finally
evolves into an all-inclusive world-system, Labriola's words pro-
foundly challenge our received notions about politics. The univer-
salization of capitalism does not universalize democracy. It only
achieves the spread of "anti-systemic movements," drawn together
across borders and cultures to face a common antagonist. Democ-
racy thus can be placed on the agenda in a way with which world
capitalism has not previously had to contend.5
IV. LIBERAL v. AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM
Capitalism developed in every country according to the inter-
nal intensity of previous social structures.5 Despite the uneven
flourishing of civil liberties and universal suffrage under capitalist
rule, certain elements regularly occur in historical forms of capital-
ist experience under conditions appropriately understood as "lib-
eral" or "authoritarian." For countries with "liberal" political tra-
ditions, such as England and France, "feudal land property and
81 Id. at 57.
12 See, e.g., N. MANDELA, THE STRUGGLE Is My LIFE passim (1986).
" For a remarkably current critique from this philosophical vantage point, see G.
LUKAcs, THE YOUNG HEGEL: STUDIES IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN DIALECTICS AND ECONOMICS
(1975).
" See, e.g., G. ARRIGHI, T. HOPKINS & I. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 10, at 114 (predicting
realignments of alliances within interstate system, increased economic fluctuation, and in-
creasing class struggle-both geographically and in intensity).
11 Takahashi, A Contribution to the Discussion, in THE TRANSITION FROM FEUDALISM TO
CAPITALIisM 95-96 (1976).
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serfdom either disintegrated in the process of the economic devel-
opment, or were wiped out structurally and categorically in the
bourgeois revolution."8 This enabled a middle class of burghers
and independent peasants to emerge. However, in nations with
more authoritarian traditions, such as Japan and Germany, "[tihe
organisation [sic] of feudal land property remained intact," and
the middle class remained underdeveloped.5 7
In Germany and Japan, with their authoritarian traditions,"8
capitalism achieved hegemony within what economist Kohachiro
Takahashi calls "an oligarchic system-the 'organic' social struc-
ture-designed to suppress bourgeois liberalism."59
"I Id.; see also E. Fox-GENOVESE & E.D. GENOVESE, FRUITS OF MERCHANT CAPITAL:
SLAVERY AND BOURGEOIS PROPERTY IN THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF CAPITALISM 3-25 (1983)
(discussing Marxian theory of transition from feudalism to capitalism); K. MARx, 3 CAPITAL:
A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 334-35 (1967) (discussing two different ways of accom-
plishing the leap from feudalism to capitalism); B. MOORE, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP
AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 3-155 (1966)
(analyzing transformation from agrarian society to industrial one in England, France, and
the liberal Western route with that of United States).
'5 Takahashi, supra note 55, at 96; see also B. MOORE, supra note 56, at 233-34 (con-
trasting Japan).
Earlier Japanese feudalism, too, lacked features that in the West made important
contributions to this growth. In the feudal bond uniting lord and vassal, the ele-
ment of contract was very weak in Japan; the elements of loyalty and duty to
superiors, on the other hand, received heavy emphasis. Western discussions of the
contrast make the Japanese feudal bond seem more primitive, less objective and
rational than its European counterpart. It rested more on unwritten custom and
ceremonial observance; it had the character of a fictive kinship relationship, some-
thing very widely used in Japanese society, and relied less than in Europe on writ-
ten or oral contract to specify individual duties or privileges.
Id. For further attempts to understand the legal structures of authoritarian capitalism, com-
pare F. NEUMANN, supra note 8, at 179-82 (German Rechtsstaat is legal formation between
status and rule of law) with Henderson, Law and Political Modernization in Japan, in
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN 415-17 (R. Ward ed. 1968) (Japanese "rule-by-
law" is located between status and Japanese experiment with rule of law). For further dis-
cussion of Japanese legal and economic development, see R. ISHIL, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN 111-12 (1980).
See, e.g., B. MooRE, supra note 56, at 433-52; see also V. BERGHAHN, MODERN GER-
MANY: SOCIETY, ECONOMY, AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 18-28 (1982); F.
FISCHER, FROM KAISERREICH TO THIRD REICH: ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY IN GERMAN HISTORY,
1871-1945, at 37-40 (R. Fletcher trans. 1986); S. IENAGA, THE PACIFIC WAR 1931-1945: A
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON JAPAN'S ROLE IN WORLD WAR 11 (1978); IMPERIAL JAPAN 1800-1945
passim (J. Livingston, J. Moore & F. Oldfather eds. 1973) (general history of Japanese social
tradition).
" Takahashi, supra note 55, at 96. Given this outline, I hope it is unnecessary to pur-
sue further here the intricacies of the "Dobbs-Sweezy debate," see id. at 9-30 (introduction
by Hilton), within contemporary sociology and comparative social history, or Barrington
Moore's classic reworking and extension across geographic and ideological lines of the "two
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Germaine Hoston has retrieved Takahashi's contribution to
the liberal/authoritarian dynamic driving the politics of capital-
isms° and highlighted his emphasis on Japanese modernization.,
She pointed out that factors external to Germany and Japan62 pro-
voked the bourgeois reforms; there, democracy developed from
"the accomplishment of an occupying power rather than that of
the native bourgeoisie. 6 3 Hoston further questioned any charac-
terization of the German-Japanese experience as "exceptional."
She concluded that European capitalism was the "historical acci-
dent,"6 4 and not the accepted norm.
I wish to underscore these lineaments of liberal and authorita-
rian capitalism, and draw them forward into an analysis of modern
bills of rights accomplished within the auspices of a newly ex-
tended capitalist imperium. Our shift away from the orthodoxy
that liberal capitalism constitutes an historical norm and that au-
thoritarian capitalism represents the exception can aid in under-
ways" contrasted here, see B. TURNSE, CITIZENSHIP AND CAPITALISM: THE DEBATE OVER RE-
FORMISM 62-63 (1986), or some of the more recent intellectual skirmishes regarding the tran-
sition from feudalism to capitalism. See, e.g., P. ANDERSON, LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTIST
STATE 18-25 (1974); A. GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE (1985); 1 M. MANN, THE
SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER: A HISTORY OF POWER FROM THE BEGINNING TO A.D. 1760, at 450-
72 (1986) (rise of capitalism led to "organic unity of the class-as-nation"); Anderson, A Cul-
ture in Contraflow-I, 180 NEW LEFT REV. 41 (1990).
60 See G. HoSTON, MARXISM AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT IN PREWAR JAPAN 288-91
(1986); Taira, Japan's Modern Economic Growth: Capitalistic Development Under Absolu-
tism, in JAPAN EXAMINED: PERSPECTIS ON MODERN JAPANESE HISTORY 34 (H. Wray & H.
Conroy eds. 1983).
61 G. HoSTON, supra note 60, at 290; see also Jessop, The Political Indeterminacy of
Democracy, in MARXISM AND DEMOCRACY 55 (A. Hunt ed. 1980) (discussing paradox of dem-
ocratic institutions existing in class-based societies and majority rule's apparent inconsis-
tency with minority exploitation, in considering whether capitalism is necessary condition
for democracy's realization). "[O]ne might question whether democracy permits the tenden-
tial elimination of capitalist exploitation and/or if such exploitation is incompatible with the
effective functioning of democratic institutions." Id.; N. POULANTZAS, FACISM AND DICTATOR-
SHIP: THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND THE PROBLEM OF FAcrSm 16 (1974) (characterizing au-
thoritarian regimes as exceptional state formations). Despite the complexity of these ques-
tions, no adequate legal theory can possibly ignore them. CLS' avoidance of these issues,
during its development in the 1980's, strikingly reveals the movement's lack of intellectual
daring, as well as its pointless diversion into deconstructive exercises. Cf. P. AYCOBERRY,
THE NAZI QUESTION: AN ESSAY ON THE INTERPRETATIONS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM 72-75
(1981); E. HOBSBAWM, POLITICS FOR A RATIONAL LEFT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (1989); K. MARX
& F. ENGELS, MARX AND ENGELS ON THE UNITED STATES (N. Rumyantese comp. 1979); T.
VEBLEN, IMPERIAL GERMANY AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUION 157-73 (1966)
02 See G. HOSTON, supra note 60, at 290.
63 Id.
6, Id. The emergence, in Western Europe, of modem capitalism its classic form indi-
cates the "inherent fragility and unstability of [its system of] feudal land property." Id.
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standing the political structure of the contemporary world's three
economic superpowers.
The liberal development of American capitalism may have
been exceptional, contrasted with authoritarian development in
Germany and Japan. These three nations' remarkably parallel eco-
nomic development during the last third of the nineteenth century,
however, represents a foundational moment in the realization of
modern industrial capitalist society.
For the United States, that moment occurred during the Civil
War with the victory over an unfree labor system in the South won
by "the last revolutionary offensive ... [of an] urban or bourgeois
capitalist democracy."65 Japan, however, experienced its shift
through the "Meiji Restoration," 6 the Tokugowa Bakufu's disinte-
gration and replacement by a revolutionary regime committed to
industrialization 67 without embracing democractic ideals e.6  For
60 B. MOORE, supra note 56, at 112. The "victory of industrial capitalism over the fet-
ters of the plantation economy, a victory that required blood and iron to occur at all, [was]
very persuasive indeed." Id. at 151; see also W. WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 303-04 (1961). For the views of Marx and Engels on the Civil War, see Rumyant-
seva, Preface in K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 61, at 18 (crediting Marx and Engels for
disclosing war as clash between firmly entrenched system of hired labor and predominant
system of slavery in South acting to brake nation's overall capitalist development).
60 See generally W. BEASLEY, THE MEIJI RESTORATION 325-49 (1972) (political impact of
Meiji restoration); G. BECKMANN, THE MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION: THE OLIGARCHS
AND THE CONSTrUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1868-1891 passim (1957) (historical analy-
sis of transformation of Japan into capitalist state and drafting of Meiji Constitution); G.
SANSOM, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1615-1867 passim (1963) (decline of feudal society in Japan).
'7 See, e.g., G. BECKMANN, THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA AND JAPAN 273-74 (1962).
The rapid industrialization of Japan became the primary economic objective of
the oligarchs. They considered it a prerequisite not only to the creation of a strong
Japan but also to the solution of a number of economic problems, especially the
pressure of deficit balances in foreign trade and the devastating effect of imported
manufactured goods on handicraft production.
Id. at 273.
" Id. at 244. Within two decades of the Meiji revolution,
[t]he government had made important concessions to those groups that demanded
a national parliament, but the Meiji Constitution was essentially a carefully for-
mulated legal justification for a regime in which power was held by a small num-
ber of men with minimal responsibility to the people. Their power continued to
stem from the doctrine that sovereignty rested in the person of the emperor, not
by divine right, but by divine descent. The government made certain that this
basic principle was beyond the possibility of constitutional change by providing
for uninterrupted imperial succession to the sovereignty of the state in the Impe-
rial House Law, which was regarded as superior to ordinary legislation and could
not be amended or supplanted by such.
Id. at 302.
Because the constitution conferred excessively broad executive powers, the emperor, in
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Germany (whose recent reunification has fostered international de-
bate regarding issues of security and border sanctity), the "found-
ing of the German Empire or Kaiserreich of 1871" was the critical
event. 9 In contrast to the American experience, the foundational
compromises in Japan and Germany eventually generated fascist
regimes.70 Thus, within the universe of capitalist development re-
sided different trajectories with distinct political and legal implica-
tions. Presenting this general critique of authoritarian capitalism
in a nutshell, social historian Barrington Moore has argued:
The second main route to the world of modern industry we
have called the capitalist and reactionary one, exemplified most
clearly by Germany and Japan. There capitalism took hold quite
firmly in both agriculture and industry and turned them into in-
dustrial countries. But it did so without a popular revolutionary
upheaval. What tendencies there were in this direction were
weak, far weaker in Japan than in Germany, and in both were
diverted and crushed. Though not the only cause, agrarian condi-
tions and the specific type of capitalist transformation that took
place in the countryside contributed very heavily to these defeats
and the feebleness behind any impulse toward Western demo-
cratic forms.
71
essence, was constitutionally authorized to construct a police state. See Norman, The Auto-
cratic State, in ORIGINS OF THE MODERN JAPANESE STATE 435-64 (1975); see also S. IENAGA,
supra note 58, at 14-15 (characterizing limited rights precariously protected under Meiji
Constitution). "The Meiji political system gagged and blindfolded the populace. Denied the
basic facts and a free exchange of opinion on the major issues of state and society, the
public could hardly participate in charting Japan's future." Id. at 15; see also McCormack,
Beyond Economism: Japan in a State of Transition, in DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY JA-
PAN 39, 45 (G. McCormack & Y. Sugimoto eds. 1986) (examining efforts of Japanese political
conservatives to undermine 1946 constitution and abandon Japanese self-restraining ordi-
nances against arms exports).
"' F. FISCHER, supra note 58, at 37 (emphasis in original). Monarchical-bureaucratic
Prussia incorporated its military-state tradition into the founding of the German Empire or
Kaiserreich of 1871. This system remained dominant until 1945. As an association of "agra-
rian-aristocratic and industrial/big-bourgeois power elites," its primary domestic purpose
was to maintain the status quo against the rising forces of democracy and Social Democracy.
Id. Moreover, its external objective was to ensure, first, Prussia's hegemony in Germany,
then Prussia-Germany's hegemony in Europe, as the basis for securing global. Id. at 38. The
largely agrarian German Empire developed "on a scale and tempo bearing comparison only
with the development of North America, into a modern industrial state." Id. at 40. The new
industrial bourgeoisie achieved economic dominance within two decades, but failed to secure
a commensurate share in political power. Bismark's economic and social policies, and the
famous alliance of "steel and rye," which reconciled the new industrial bourgeoisie with the
agrarian-feudal forces. Id.
70 See B. MOORE, supra note 56, at 228-313, 413-32.
1 Id. at 433. By "Western democratic forms," Moore refers to "liberal capitalist
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Ironically, this double portrait of modernization potentially
undermines the strength of my central assertion (that universaliza-
tion of capitalism under present circumstances cannot of itself
guarantee the safety of individual liberty or the durability of
rights). In other words, one could plausibly argue that if capital-
ism-or its development in "the new Big Three" 2-- has been
predominantly, though not exclusively, authoritarian, its most re-
cent postwar, American-sponsored liberal manifestations neverthe-
less set the tone for the present world-system.73 One might even
assert that this "liberalization" of world order is precisely the
meaning of the second World War.
V. QUESTIONING THE DURABILITY OF LIBERAL CAPITALISM
Indeed, one familiar perspective suggests that New Deal radi-
calism, not authoritarian accommodation, determined postwar
United States policy-making. But this would require that we spec-
ulate about political developments unfolding from a different his-
tory than the one we know. For example, if the American military
in occupied Japan had not used its power in 1947 to quash a gen-
eral strike movement, would Japan's economy today reflect such
concentration of private wealth?74 If American officials and labor
forms," distinct from "authoritarian capitalist forms." Once America's postwar occupation
policy had presumedly exported the "Western democratic form" to Germany and Japan, it
became commonplace to refer to the latter, formerly fascist states, as part of the "Western
block." Inclusion of an Asian nation like Japan in the "Western block" does not necessarily
guarantee that "the West" has outgrown its historically pronounced anti-Asian racism.
Rather, the designation suggests that Japan adopted the western world's anti-communism.
See TRILATERALISM: THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION AND ELITE PLANNING FOR WORLD MANAGE-
MENT 5 (H. Sklar ed. 1980). For a wide-ranging discussion of Japan's qualified self-percep-
tion as "Western," see J. HUNTER, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN JAPAN: AN INTRODUCTORY
HISTORY SINCE 1853 (1989); MODERN JAPAN: ASPECTS OF HISTORY, LITERATURE AND SOCIETY
52-66 (W. Beasley ed. 1975); H. SMITH, KIYOCHIrA: ARTIST OF MEIJI JAPAN (1988); K. TAKRO,
JAPAN AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION (1983).
Rowley, supra note 12.
"Setting the tone for the world-system" has more regularly involved the United
States in struggles against advocates of future socialism than against the remnants of au-
thoritarian capitalism in the postwar world. See, e.g., Dower, E.H. Norman, Japan and the
Uses of History, in ORIGINS OF THE MODERN JAPANESE STATE 3-101 (J. Dower ed. 1975) (dis-
cussing U.S. policymakers' desire to mesh "arsenal of ideas" with larger arsenal of American
military, technological and economic power to create theoretical framework capable of com-
peting with Marxism); see also L. GARDNER, SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
RESPONSE TO REVOLUTION, 1913-1923, at 25-44 (1984) (decline of imperialism led to America
"doing the world's work").
I" See J. MOORE, JAPANESE WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 1945-1947, at 240
(1983). Despite his unconvincing criticism of Japanese Communist strategy during 1945-
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leaders had not been deployed in Germany after the war to frus-
trate "anti-fascist elements in the German working class" and their
"grassroots democratization movement, ' 75 would the contours of
Germany's contemporary economic structure be the same? Per-
haps we could even envision a past free of America's tragic war
against the Vietnamese people .7  Despite the attraction of such
speculations, we must nonetheless draw conclusions from actual
social history.
In short, two of the three superpowers dominant in the emerg-
ing capitalist world-system (i.e., Japan and Germany) embraced
authoritarian rather than liberal forms of capitalism.77 In contrast,
the United States adopted the liberal mode, primarily because of
its pivotal experience of an extremely violent civil war.7 8 At the
1947, Moore provides an insightful analysis of the politics of class struggles during those
years. For an interesting account of the influence of Japanese Communist leaders during the
Vietnam War, see R. SCALAPINO, THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1920-1966, at 267
(1967) (Japanese Communist leaders perceived Vietnam's struggle against U.S. as important
to unifying world communism and "achieving their primary goals: a continuous struggle on
behalf of 'correct Marxism-Leninism' []unremitting pressure upon the Soviet Union to
abandon all manifestations of the 'soft line' and to rededicate itself to revolutionary
leadership").
71 K. VAN DER Pus., THE MAKING OF AN ATLANTIC RULING CLASS 151 (1984); see Graf,
Anti-Communism in the Federal Republic of Germany, in THE SocIALIsT REGISTER 1984, at
164, 166-167 (R. Miliband, J. Saville & M. Liebman eds. 1984) (analyzing U.S. prohibition of
political activities, rejection of "constitutional provisions calling for socialization of key eco-
nomic sectors" and "restoration of pre-war elites and renazification" by exonerating those
individuals and classes who actively collaborated in, formulated, and executed in Nazi pol-
icy); see also Rentschler, The Use and Abuse of Memory: New German Film and the Dis-
course of Bitburg, 36 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 67, 88 (1985) (comparing President Reagan's
adoption of "sole responsibility of Hitler" thesis-focusing blame on Hitler's demonic lead-
ership-with popular historiography of 1950's and challenging Reagan's equation of dead
Nazis with concentration camp victims). For general discussions of the "restoration"of au-
thoritarian power in Japan and Germany, see W. BORDEN, THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE: UNITED
STATES FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY AND JAPANESE TRADE RECOVERY, 1947-1955, at 61-102
(1984); J. BORKIN, THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF LG. FARBEN 157-63 (1978); T. BOWER,
BLIND EYE TO MURDER: BRITAIN, AMERICA AND THE PURGING OF NAzI GERrANY-A PLEDGE
BETRAYED 287-311 (1981); J. KOLKO & G. KOLKO, THE LIMirs OF POWER: THE WORLD AND
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954, at 431-37 (1972); M. SCHALLER, THE AMERICAN
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN ASIA (1985); H. SCHONBERGER,
AFTERMATH OF WAR: AMERICANS AND REMAKING OF JAPAN, 1945-1952, at 90-110 (1989).
16 G. KOLKO, VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MODERN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
538 (1985).
" See supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
7' See B. MooRE, supra note 56, at 152-53 ("the Northern victory, even with all its
ambitious consequences, was a political victory for freedom compared with what a Southern
victory would have been"). See generally E. FoNER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988) (comprehensive analysis of reconstruction); H. HYMAN, A
MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTI-
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same time, despite their decisive victory in the 1860's, progressive
Northern elements in the United States ultimately compromised
with reactionary forces,79 which delayed universal suffrage until
the 1960's (indeed, later than its adoption in Japan and Ger-
many)."' While the liberal/authoritarian distinction had, by the
1930's, become sufficient to precipitate a world war, it was not im-
mune to political manipulation. As Wallerstein pointed out,
"[tihere were many hints ... that [the Soviet Union] might find it
more comfortable to be diplomatically close to Germany or closer
than to the [United States]. This might have been catastrophic for
the [United States], and one of Roosevelt's first moves in power
was to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR."'" Thus, in
both domestic and foreign affairs, liberal capitalism presented it-
self as being "left of center"; it not only won popular support at
home and abroad, but it also secured the Soviet Union as an ally
against Hitler."2 Once Germany and Japan had been defeated,
however, American policy changed. In terms of the interstate sys-
tem, the
[United States] emerged as the uncontested hegemonic
power. Furthermore there were no longer any significant "right-
ist" governments among the core states. On the world scene, the
US quickly shifted therefore from being "left of center" to being
the leader of a "free world" alliance against the world left, now
dubbed "communist totalitarianism." The very concept "totali-
tarianism," which sought to put communist and fascist regimes in
the same box, was an attempt to create a facade of diplomatic
TUTION passim (1973) (same); D. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861, at 448-84 (1976)
(general discussion of southern separatist ideals); B. SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO
NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1835-1877, at 160-87 (1973) (effect of reconstruction
on Constitution).
7' See W. WI.LI MS, supra note 65, at 300 (Civil War did not produce unconditional
defeat of South because of residual white supremacy and "subversive weapon of economic
opportunity"). "The stage was being set for an alliance of these [moderate men of sub-
stance] across the former battle lines ... [W]hen Southern 'Junkers' were no longer slave-
holders and had acquired a larger tincture of urban business and when Northern capitalists
faced radical rumblings, the classic conservative coalition was possible." Id. at 148-49.
80 See supra note 14.
81 Wallerstein, The USA in the World Today, in THE POLITICS OF THE WORLD-ECON-
OMY: THE STATES, THE MOVEMErrs, AND THE CIVlLIZAToNs 69, 70 (1984).
82 Id. at 70-71; see also M. Davis, The Barren Marriage of American Labor and the
Democratic Party, in PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN THE
HISTORY OF THE US WORKING CLASS 52 (1986) (discussing consequences for working people
of aligning with nonlabor political party).
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continuity over the reality of a significant realignment.8 3
The disparity between liberal and authoritarian capitalism
may have appeared greatest during the brief period when the
United States presented itself as more "left of center" than its
events usually require. Indeed, the rapidity with which the United
States supported precisely those authoritarian elements in the ad-
ministrative and corporate structures of America's defeated ene-
mies (even to the extent of placing reactionary forces back in
power despite strong opposition from democratic majorities in
their own countries) suggests nothing less.8
We have a right to be worried about the potential authorita-
rian use of political repression-or the Berufsverbot-under post-
war German constitutionalism. 5 We have the same right to be
8 Wallerstein, supra note 81, at 71. For the argument that this "reverse course" in
policy resulted from internal economic and political imperatives, rather than the highly pop-
ularized fear of a Soviet threat, see G. KOLKO & J. KOLKO, supra note 75, at 525.
4 See, e.g., J. BORKIN, supra note 75, at 138-39 (cold war made Germany sought after
ally); K. VAN DER PLL, supra note 75, at 150-51 (contrasting politics of American and Euro-
pean labor unions); Graf, supra note 75 (political party and trade union leaders appointed
from those prominent in Third Reich as cold war intensified):
By the time the prosecution of the I.G. [Farben] officials began in 1947, a new
element had been added to the objections of war crimes trials. The cold war had
begun. Germany, the wartime enemy, had become a sought after ally; the
U.S.S.R., the former ally, was now regarded as the enemy. Congressman John E.
Rankin of Mississippi declared on the floor of the House of Representatives:
"What is taking place in Nuremburg, Germany, is a disgrace to the United States.
Every other country now has washed its hands and withdrawn from the saturnalia
of persecution. But a racial minority, two and a half years after the war closed, are
in Nuremburg not only hanging German soldiers but trying German businessmen
in the name of the United States."
J. BORKIN, supra note 75, at 139-40.
The failure to punish the I.G. Farben executives convicted of savage and criminal con-
duct, including mass murder (and the gradual rehabilitation of I.G. Farben), represent a
horrifying tale of irresponsibility and conspiracy. See id. at 154. For those who wish assis-
tance in decoding the not particularly subtle anti-Semitism reflected in Congressman
Rankin's account of German business's "persecution," see two truly exemplary studies: P.
FREDRIKSON, FROM JESUS TO CHRIST: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT IMAGES OF JEsus
(1988) (historical and scriptural critique of origins of Christian anti-Semitism); G. MossE,
TOWARD THE FINAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN RACISM passim (1985) (general his-
tory of anti-semitism in Europe).
85 See Graf, supra note 75, at 192-93.
In popular usage, Berufsverbot refers to the Anti-Radical Decree of 28 Janu-
ary 1972, a joint declaration by the Federal Chancellor and the Llinder premiers
banning from public service, at the federal, Land, or local level, persons defined as
"extremists", "radicals" or "anti-democrats"... (S)ince then it" ... has had the
active support of a legislature that provides a broad network of legislation, author-
izing political repression, of a judiciary that is frighteningly cooperative and
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deeply disturbed as do Japanese civil libertarians regarding both
the attempted assassination of Nagasaki Mayor Motoshima
Hitoshi by a member of a right-wing group and the Japanese gov-
ernment's possible contribution to the incident.86 But, such viola-
tions find their origin in a recent past. The potential shredding of
pliant, and, most alarming, of a trade union movement that with only few excep-
tions collaborates to the point of-admitted and documented--'cooperation' with
the Special Branch." Etymologically, the term Berufsverbot (ban on practicing
one's occupation) alludes to the fact that, in a nation where well over one-tenth of
the working force are public servants-from railway workers to university profes-
sors-to be barred from public service is de facto to be excluded from one's pro-
fession, particularly in the case of teachers, administrators and others who cannot
expect to find a post outside the state agencies ... Critics of the Berufsverbot
have rightly made much of its continuity with Obrigkeitsstaat tradition in Ger-
many, Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Law, the Nazi complex of political justice and
Adenauer's 1960 Anti-Radical Law....
Id. at 192; see von Braunmuhl, The "Enemy Within" The Case of the Berufsverbot, in THE
SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978, at 56 (1978); see also J. ARDAGH, GERMANY AND THE GERMANS: AN
ANATOMY OF SOCmTY TODAY 420 (1987) (Germany's bureaucratic rules have not been suited
to distinguish effectively between anti-democratic subversives and mere radical critics, lead-
ing to allegations of "McCarthyism"). Despite Ardagh's assertion that "institutions and the
machinery" of German government have been "working quite smoothly," political opposi-
tion from the left has been systematically targeted for unconstitutional violence and harass-
ment. Id. at 421. More significant, the shakiness of German democracy, like that in Japan or
in the United States, results not from unreliable popular sentiment or national psychology,
but from the concrete stake that economic power may have in running afoul of either civil
liberties or direct voter access to the "machinery of government." Id. With friends such as
Ardagh, German democracy and the rule of law require no enemies. For a critique of others
too tolerant of anti-constitutional trends in Germany, see West Germany: An Interview
with Philip Agee, in DIRTY WORK: THE CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE 184 (P. Agee & L. Wolf
eds. 1978).
" Nobuaki, Terror, Taboo and Silence: Speaking Out on the Emperor System, 21
AMPo: JAPAN-AsIA Q. REv. 57, 57 (1990); see Smith, Food for Thought, FAR E. EcoN. REV.
10, 10 (Feb. 1, 1990).
An attack on the mayor of Nagasaki, Hitoshi Motoshima, by a member of an
obscure rightist organisation on 18 January may have been a warning that politi-
cal extremism is about to enter a new and more active phase in Japan.
The ostensible reason for the incident, in which Motoshima was shot in the
chest (but not killed) by a 40-year-old gunman, was the mayor's statement more
than a year ago that the late Emperor Hirihito bore some responsibility for Ja-
pan's conduct during World War II "as well as all of us who lived at that time."
But the action may also have had a forward-looking significance.
Id. Mayor Motoshima's statement, derived from his own wartime experience, evoked wide
political response. Despite pressure from his own Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP"),
Motoshima did not withdraw his remark. Nobuaki, supra. The LDP consequently removed
him from his party position. Id. The President of the LDP Rule Committee then remarked:
"Motoshima should know who made him mayor of Nagasaki." Id. After violent right-wing
street protest, culminating in shots fired at City Hall, the mayor hired personal security.
However, upon demands from the LDP-packed City Assembly, "Motoshima called off his
guard. The new year came and Motohima [sic] was shot." Id.
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any credible bill of rights for German and Japanese democracies
depends, not on the 1930's, but on the late-1940's and 1950's when
both the construction of new constitutional guarantees, and the
systematic destruction of civil liberty through the massive purges
of the political left-wing took place.8 7 "[A]nti-Communist dis-
charges [in Japan] reached a total of 22,000 in all, fifteen times the
relatively small number the Occupation had purged from the
higher levels of the economy in 1947 and 1948-to the acute dis-
tress of conservatives." ' Thousands more Japanese, especially in
the labor union movement, lost employment through firings
designed as much to send a message as to silence individual em-
ployees.89 Ironically, laws that were quickly enacted to guarantee
the transition from authoritarian to liberal capitalism were used to
justify purges perpetuating the ruling structures of authoritarian
power. Consequently, liberal constitutionalism only marginally
sought the liberation of most Germans and Japanese in the post-
war political environment.
A mistaken reading of these events would be to see them as
the obscure victory of reactionary remnants over the best inten-
tions of American occupation liberals. On the contrary, the Ameri-
can command inspired the anti-communist purges; 0 if the new do-
mestic political apparatus facilitated their administration, then
United States attitudes provided a powerful teaching model. The
brilliant American historian of Japan, John W. Dower, described
87 See, e.g., M. SCHALLER, supra note 75, at 267-68 (crackdown on Japanese left); R.
SWEARINGEN & P. LANGER, RED FLAG IN JAPAN: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN ACTION 1919-
1951, at 242-43 (1968) (same, in Japan); Graf, supra note 75 (same, in Germany).
88 T. COHEN, REMAKING JAPAN: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION As NEW DEAL 452 (1987).
89 For a detailed account of how selective political terminations affected union organiz-
ing and resistance to authoritarianism in postwar Japan, see J. MOORE, supra note 74, at
185-240.
90 T. COHEN, supra note 88, at 450 ("although the purge was apparently a completely
Japanese initiative, everyone was certain, rightly or wrongly, that the Occupation was be-
hind it all"); cf. M. SCHALLER, supra note 75, at 267 (stating that MacArthur's ordered
crackdown on Japan Communist Party led to purge of the party leadership). Finally, Cohen
and Schaller agree that the purpose of the purges was to silence the most energetic and
effective union activists. See T. COHEN, supra note 88, at 450. Although theoretically being a
Communist violated no law (the Constitution in fact guaranteed freedom of speech and pro-
hibited discrimination because of "creed")-a Fukuoka District Court decision in Septem-
ber of 1950 declined to provide these protections to Communists on the basis that "'the
objective of the Japan Communist Party is the bondage of class dictatorial power' and 'the
guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitution does not give the right-even in order
to realize a certain ideal-to ignore the basic rights of others."' Id.; cf. J. ARDAGH, sUpra
note 85 (Berufsverbot is unconstitutional if applied to speech of "mere critics" but constitu-
tional if applied to "subversives").
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American political influence on the policies of postwar Japanese
Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru:
During his second and third cabinets, he proposed the crea-
tion of an "Un-Japanese Activities Committee" in the lower
house of the Diet. The [United States] Congress was his obvious
inspiration here, and although this did not materialize, in June
1949 the government did create an internal intelligence apparatus
devoted to investigation of communists and leftists .... This
agency, often compared to the American F.B.I., was headed dur-
ing this period by Yoshikawa Mitsusada... who became known
to Americans in 1951 when he testified before the Senate Sub-
committee on Internal Security (the McCarran committee) in the
inquisition of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Many of the per-
sonnel who joined the bureau after the Korean War broke out
were depurgees formerly associated with the prewar Home Minis-
try and Special Higher Police.91
American sponsorship of unreconstructed authoritarians after
the war does not indicate some sort of abstract moral confusion or
failure. On the contrary, it reveals an alarming but profound his-
torical truth: the wall separating liberal and authoritarian legal
and political institutions may not be nearly as sturdy as many ad-
vocates of democracy had hoped.2
Governments often seek to deploy popular ideology to justify
misuse of modern technology. Germany and Japan, of course, were
not unique. Since the second World War, Western liberal democra-
cies have begun to display more and more of these same traits for
reasons broadly similar though they no longer have much to do
with agrarian questions.9 Surely the American use of napalm
91 J. DOWER, EMPIRE AND AFrERMATH 365 (1979).
92 See Feher, The French Revolutions as Models for Marx's Conception of Politics, 8
THESIS ELEVEN 59, 70 (1984). "In simpler language the dilemma can be put thus: the mo-
ment the ruling classes feel that their property is threatened by the masses, they will intro-
duce anti-democratic, even fascist forms of social and political rule." Id. Given this di-
lemma, Feher demands that we recognize "different logics in modernity, among others, a
logic of democracy and a logic of capitalism which are, beyond any doubt, at odds with each
other." Id. at 71. If democracy and capitalism are at odds with each other, as Feher insists,
the rule of law and capitalism are certain to be as well.
'3 See id. Theory and Politics, 38 TELOs 124, 148 (1978-79) (interview with Herbert
Marcuse).
Bourgeois democracy, insofar as it is at all possible after fascism, is worth
striving for in the face of fascism as an existing danger. But it seems that precisely
this bourgeois democracy has been dismantled and maimed continuously by the
bourgeoisie itself and by big capital ... [E]ven in democracies based on competi-
tive political parties, no particularly great efforts are made, for example, to con-
strain the arbitrary power exercised by the police.
[Vol. 65:85
BILLS OF RIGHTS IN JEOPARDY
against the children of Vietnam cannot be excluded from this som-
ber reflection. 4 But how do we prevent this reverse transformation
of liberal into authoritarian values and politics? What motivates
the United States in its commitment to capitalism at all costs? 5
Are universal suffrage (and democratic control of the state) as
well as the Bill of Rights genuinely in jeopardy in the United
States today? Perhaps. In 1989, both houses of Congress passed a
bill designed to prevent a repeat of the Iran-Contra affair; it cur-
tailed the executive branch's ability to pursue any privately funded
Id. Marcuse exchanged this comment with his colleague, Jtirgen Habermas, who, perhaps
more than anyone else, has identified the irreducible core of Marcuse's "bourgeois democ-
racy" with "principles of formal law and popular sovereignty," i.e., with Bills of Rights and
universal suffrage. For both Marcuse and Habermas, liberal capitalism's capacity to "cross
the line" into authoritarian capitalism is utterly real. Following the kind of warning offered
by Marcuse and Habermas, Nicos Poulantzas has argued that authoritarian capitalism, al-
though "[tihe exceptional State form" of capitalism, still belongs to the capitalist type of
State, not only in terms of State power, but also in its institutional forms; this also holds for
the fascist State as an exceptional capitalist State." N. POULANTZAS, FACISM AND DICTATOR-
SHIP: THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND THE PROBLEM OF FACiSM 313 (J. White trans. 1974)
(emphasis in original). Although distinguishing between the "legal state" and the "police
state," Poulantzas objected to the prevailing view that the "totalitarian State" is the antith-
esis of the "liberal state." "This is quite incorrect. . . ." Id. at 320. Under both liberal and
authoritarian regimes, capitalist legal institutions remain capitalist. Id.
At the same time, authoritarian capitalist legal institutions have characteristics all their
own. Whereas liberal capitalist legal institutions both limit the exercise of State power and
regulate that power, under authoritarian capitalism, "[t]he law is no longer the limit," and
legal regulation becomes increasingly arbitrary. Id. at 322. Under liberal capitalism, "[1]aw
therefore allows the relation of forces within the alliance in power to be modified without
the overthrow of the State, without affecting what Lenin called the State's envelope. The
juridical system thus lays down its own rules of transformation; this is the main role of the
Constitution." Id. at 321 (emphasis in original). Recent political crises in the United States
have frightfully strained the orthodox, liberal conception of "rules of transformation," even
normal rules of transition in the executive apparatus of government within American polit-
ics. N. CHoMsKY, THE CULTURE OF TERRORISM (1988); L. COCKBURN, OUT OF CONTROL 131-63
(1987); L. EVANS & A. MYERS, WATERGATE & THE MYTH OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1974); J.
GARRISON, ON THE TRAIL OF THE ASSASSINS (1988); A. KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 1-38 (1983)
(analysis of watergate wiretapping); J. LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON
YEARS (1976); B. MOYERS, MOYERs: THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS
2-4 (Public Affairs Television, Inc., broadcast Nov. 4, 1987). There can be no doubt but that
"what Lenin called the State's envelope" has been opened to a remarkable degree in the
United States subsequent to the founding of the National Security state during and after
World War II. See G. KOLKO, THE POLrICS OF WAR: THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES FOR-
EIGN POLICY 143-45 (1968).
See N. ZAROULiS & G. SULLIVAN, WHO SPOKE UP? AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST THE
WAR IN VIETNAM 1963-1975, at 103-05 (1984).
95 Cf. Chase, supra note 1, at 325-27 (liberalism must ultimately choose between prop-
erty rights and human rights).
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foreign policy.98 During the floor debate, Senator Jesse Helms of
North Carolina conceded the requirement that the President share
power in foreign policy; he further argued that it would suffice
were the President to share that power with third world countries,
corporations, or even wealthy Americans, rather than the legisla-
tive branch, so long as the United States Treasury did not have to
fund any such activity. Senator George Mitchell of Maine replied:
With all respect, I strongly disagree with that assertion. The
President of the United States is as constrained by law as is every
other American. The President must obey the law and Congress
has authority to make the law. This is a democracy, not a monar-
chy. The President is not a king."
However, Senator Helms was unpersuaded. He repeated: "If the
President can execute the policy without calling on the [United
States] Treasury, then the Constitution puts up no barrier."' 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Those who identify Senator Helms as an isolated reactionary,
or a backwoods reminder of segregation in the solid South, should
note that President Bush ultimately vetoed the bill attacked by
Helms.99 It would seem that the Republican administration per-
ceives super-secret, self-financing, and self-perpetuating "enter-
prises" to be necessary for the full implementation of United
States policy in international affairs. 100 Who, then, can assert that
the principle of separation of powers, or the integrity of the Bill of
Rights' guarantees, or the efficacy of meaningful universal suffrage
remains intact? Have not these foundations of the legal state be-
come more tenuous with each passing invasion, crisis, or scan-
dal?10 1 The conflict does not consist in a struggle between democ-
go See Draper, The Constitution in Danger, THE NEw YORK REV., March 1, 1990, at 46
(analysis of Iran-Contra affair showing how presidential power circumvented congressional
will); see also The Constitution in Danger: An Exchange, THE NEW YORK REV., May 17,
1990, at 50 (Draper debates government lawyers on implied executive power).
9 Draper, supra note 96.
98 Id.
Id.
109 Id.
1o1 Cf. N. POULANTZAS, supra note 93, at 327 (describing decline of "parliamentary de-
mocracy" and role of legislative branch during slide from liberalism into the executive, in-
terventionist and finally authoritarian state). The rather meager role that Congress played
in the decisions regarding both Panama and the Middle East during 1989-1991 (which ap-
peared satisfactory to Congress), the decline of party competition, the bribery and campaign
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racy and monarchy, as suggested by Senator Mitchell,102 nor,
perhaps, between liberal and authoritarian capitalism-however
much their opposition has shaped modern political history. Under
the new alignments structuring the capitalist world system at the
close of the present century, it may well be that the crucial con-
frontation will occur between essentially authoritarian public and
private power, on the one hand, and rights-based anti-systemic
movements,103 on the other-that is, between capitalism and the
rule of law.10 4
fund-raising crises within both state and federal legislatures, the abandonment of congres-
sional leadership in budget submissions and regulation of financial institutions, and the de-
velopment of parallel power networks (the Plumbers and Cointelpro under Nixon; Casey's
and North's Enterprise under Reagan/Bush) may indicate the emergence of "the excep-
tional state." The considerable elaboration of repressive state policies in the name of a "war
on drugs," has surely raised a sufficient number of warning signs.
102 135 CONG. REc. S8107-03 (daily ed. July 18, 1989). .
103 See G. ARRIGHI, T. HOPKINS & I. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 10.
"04 Bills of rights and universal suffrage may not exhaust the definition of democracy
but we can state with certainty: no rule of law, no democracy. The contradiction between
the rule of law and authoritarian capitalism, as we have seen, is especially sharp. See E.
Hobsbawm, Farewell to the Classic Labour Movement?, in PoLIrIcs FOR A RATIONAL LEFT
159, 165 (1989) (suggesting that capitalism could resort to "the solution of the political
right"); see also Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385,
1423-33 (1989) (as America has expanded its imperial power, the rise of emergency power in
executive branch becomes increasingly dangerous).
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